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Introduction
I Mean field games: stochastic differential games with large
number of players (N →∞).
I Developed by Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions
(2007) and by Minyi Huang, Roland Malhame and Peter
Caines (2006).
I Coupled set of PDEs: Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman (backward
in time) and Fokker-Planck (forward in time).
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u(x ,T ) = G (x(T ),m(x ,T )), m(x , 0) = m0(x).
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Introduction
In application to fisheries, we arrive at a coupled system of
equations of the form:
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uxx − ru = −F (x ,N, L(N,m)), (1)
∂m
∂t
+ (mux)x − σ
2
2
mxx = 0, (2)
dN
dt
= aN
(
1− N
K
)
− L(N,m). (3)
u(T , x) = G (x(T ),m(T ),N(T )); m(0, x) = m0(x); N(0) = N0.
(4)
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Game Theory Terminology
Game theory:
I Rational agents aiming to maximise their payoff.
I They select a strategy from set of possible strategies.
I Payoff depends on their own strategy and the strategy of
other players.
I Nash Equilibrium: no player can improve payoff by
(unilaterally) altering strategy.
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Game Theory Example - Prisoner’s Dilemma
I Players aim to minimise
time in prison.
I Strategy: choose to
betray the other or
remain silent.
I Nash equilibrium: both
prisoners betray the
other.
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Game Theory to Mean Field Games
Key Assumptions For A Mean Field Game:
I The number of players N is large.
I Individual players can be considered “small” compared to the
total mass of players.
I Players are homogeneous (they would take same action if in
the same position)
I Players consider other players interchangeable (no complex
interindividual strategies).
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Game Theory to Mean Field Games
Mean field game approach:
I Take limit as N →∞; a continuum of agents.
I Individual agents considered infinitesmal compared to the
total mass of other agents.
I The interaction between agents is given by a “mean field”.
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Mean Field Game Equations - General Setting
I Agents’ state given by x ∈ Ω with dynamics:
dxt = α(x , t)dt + σdWt .
I α(x , t) is the agent’s control, Wt is independent Brownian
noise.
I The density of agents is m(x , t), with the initial density given
by m(x , 0) = m0.
I m must be a valid probability density function:∫
Ω
m(x , t) dx = 1 m(x , t) ≥ 0.
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Mean Field Game Equations - General Setting
I Agents aim to maximise:
E
(∫ T
0
λ(α, x) + F (x ,m) dt + G (x(T ),m(x ,T ))
)
.
I λ(α, x) depends on state and control.
I F (x ,m) depends on state and distribution of other agents.
I T is the horizon time.
I G (x(T ),m(x ,T )) is a cost at horizon time T .
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Mean Field Game Equations - HJB Equation
I Define the value function u(x , t) as:
u(x , t) = max
α(x ,t)
E
(∫ T
t
λ(α, x) + F (x ,m) dt + G (x(T ),m(x ,T ))
)
.
I Define the Hamiltonian H(x , p) as:
H(x , p) = sup
α(x ,t)
(α(x , t)p + λ(α, x)).
I Optimal Control Theory: u(x , t) satisfies the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
∂u
∂t
+
σ2
2
∆u + H(x ,∇u) = −F (x ,m).
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Mean Field Game Equations - Fokker-Planck Equation
I The optimal control α∗(x , t) associated with the HJB
equation is given by
α∗(x , t) = Hp(x ,∇u),
where Hp(x , p)) is the derivative of H w.r.t. p.
I If agents behave optimally then
dxt = α
∗(x , t)dt + σdWt .
I And the evolution of the density m of agents is given by the
Fokker-Planck (FP) or Kolmogorov Forward equation:
∂m
∂t
− σ
2
2
∆m +∇ · (m Hp(x ,∇u)) = 0.
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Mean Field Game Equations - MFG System
The coupled MFG system is given by the HJB equation with
terminal condition for u (backwards) and the Fokker-Planck
equation with initial condition for m (forwards).
∂u
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+
σ2
2
∆u + H(x ,∇u) = −F (x ,m). (HJB)
∂m
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∆m +∇ · (m Hp(x ,∇u)) = 0. (FP)
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Application to Fisheries
I Fisheries: often many
agents (fishermen) have
access to the same
resource.
I “Tragedy of the
Commons” -
overexploitation of the
common resource (NB:
similar to Prisoner’s
Dilemma but with many
players).
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MFG Formulation - Fisheries
I An agent’s fishing effort x(t) on a single fish stock N(t) (one
dimension) evolves according to the SDE
dxt = α(x , t)dt + σdWt ,
where α(x , t) is the agent’s control and Wt is their
independent Brownian noise.
I Each agent aims to maximise total profit given by
E
(∫ T
0
R(x ,N,m)− C (x , α(x , t))) dt + G (x(T ),m(T , x),N(T ))
)
where R(x ,N,m) = qx(t)N(t)p(t, L) and
C (x , α) = cx + γ α
2
2 .
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MFG Formulation - Fisheries
I Fish stock (common resource) evolves according to:
dN
dt
= aN
(
1− N
K
)
− L(m,N),
I The landings L(m,N) are given by:
L(m,N) = N(t)q
∫ ∞
0
x(t)m(t, x) dx .
I The price p(t, L) depends on landings L(t) through a price
flexibility coefficient δ.
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MFG Formulation - Fisheries
The full mean field game system is then given by
∂u
∂t
+
(ux)
2
2
+
σ2
2
uxx − ru = −(qx(t)N(t)p(t, L)− cx(t)), (5)
∂m
∂t
+ (mux)x − σ
2
2
mxx = 0, (6)
dN
dt
= aN
(
1− N
K
)
− L(N,m). (7)
u(T , x) = 0; m(0, x) = m0(x); N(0) = N0. (8)
With Neumann boundary conditions for u and m at the boundaries
x = 0 and x = xmax .
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Numerical Method for MFG Fisheries Model
The system of PDEs is solved numerically using an iterated
scheme:
I Solve the HJB equation backwards in time (Euler Method),
where m(t, x) = m0(x) for all t to obtain u1.
I For ui , obtain mi and Ni by solving the Kolmogorov and the
resource ODE forward in time given ui .
I Obtain ui+1 by solving the HJB equation backwards in time
given mi and Ni .
I Repeat the last two steps until the error between iterates is
below a selected tolerance.
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model
I Numerical simulations of the MFG model can be used to
compare the stock, harvest, price and fishing effort
distribution over time under different economic or ecological
scenarios (e.g. different levels of price flexibility or different
stock growth functions).
I The potential effectiveness or impact of different regulations
can be considered by adding new cost terms (usually in terms
of preserving fishing stock and bringing harvest to maximum
sustainable yield targets)
I Possible regulation regimes: Tax on Catch, Tax on Effort,
License Fees.
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model - Base
Case Example
For our test case, we will use the parameter set:
I xmin = 0, xmax = 1,
I t0 = 0, T = 10,
I r = 0.05, q = 2, c = 2,
I p0 = 1, δ = 0.4,
I γ = 10, σ = 1,
I a = 1.5, K = 200, N = 70,
with m0 as a uniform distribution. Ecological parameters fitted to
North Sea Cod stock, economic parameters used are simplified
selection informed by various UK fleet costs and prices.
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model - Base
Case Example
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model - Base
Case Example
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model -
Regulations
Regulations are incorporated by adding cost terms to the cost
function F :
I License Fees - flat fee for any fishing (above some low
threshold value):
F (x ,N, L(m,N)) = qxNp(L)− cx − CLIxL(x), (9)
where IxL(x) is equal to one if x ≥ xL and is zero if x < xL.
with m0 as a uniform distribution.
I Tax on Catch - additional fee on each unit of landings:
F (x ,N, L(m,N)) = qxN(p(L)− CP)− cx , (10)
where the parameter CP is the additional cost per unit landed
to an agent due to the regulation.
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model -
Regulations
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Figure: m with no regulation (Base Case parameters), N(T) = 23.38
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model -
Regulations
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Figure: m with License Fee regulation, N(T) = 45.21
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model -
Regulations
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Figure: m with Tax on Catch regulation, N(T) = 32.55
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Numerical Simulations of MFG Fisheries Model -
Regulations
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Figure: m with Time Dependent Catch on Tax Regulation, N(T) = 30.47
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Conclusions
I Mean Field Games are a tool for analysis of stochastic
differential games with many players.
I Typically lead to a coupled HJB equation (backwards) and
Fokker-Planck equation (forwards)
I MFG Formulation of Fish Stock Exploitation includes HJB and
Fokker-Planck equations coupled with fish stock equations.
I Numerical simulations from MFG Fish Stock Exploitation
model can be used to compare the impact of different
regulation regimes on a scenario.
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